Volume 40

Issue 4

Article 6

June 1934

Note Re Incapacity as an Excuse for Failure to Notify Insurer
Regarding Total Disability

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Note Re Incapacity as an Excuse for Failure to Notify Insurer Regarding Total Disability, 40 W. Va. L. Rev.
(1934).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss4/6

This Editorial Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

et al.: Note Re Incapacity as an Excuse for Failure to Notify Insurer Reg
EDITORIAL NOTES
under any and all circumstances, until final decree. (2) They have
abolished the necessity for entry of the former rule to answer as
a condition precedent to entry of a decree, and thus have prevented the possibility of reversal of a decree because of oversight
in failure to enter a rule to answer. Beyond these two things, a
great deal has not been accomplished in the way of fixing even a
more definite time within which the answer must be filed.
Approximately what the present situation amounts to is that a tentative statutory rule to answer, subject to modification within the
court's discretion by way of substituting a judicial rule to answer,
has been substituted for the former judicial rule to answer. The
final results must await the test of judicial construction.
-LEo CARLIN.

NOTE Re INCAPACITY AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY
INSURER REGARDING TOTAL DISABILITY. In the previous discus-

sion1 of the requirement of notification to the insurer of the total
disability of the insured, - as a condition precedent to waiver of
payment of premiums under a life policy, - it was suggested that
the requisite notice might be excused where the proven physical
or mental incapacity of the insured made performance of the condition impossible.
Hence, forfeiture of the policy would be
averted, and a result achieved more in accord with social interests
in the individual life and conservation of social resources., Such
an approach had already been followed in Virginia,' when the
problem later arose in West Virginia and was disposed of by the
Supreme Court of Appeals simply by resort to ordinary principles
of strict contract law.'
The issue has now been decided in a recent decision' by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit, holding that
such supervening impossibility may excuse performance of the con"Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 276.
'POUxN, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed., 1928) XIII.,
A3., iv and vi., pp. 66, 69.
3 Swann v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156 Va. 852, 159 S. E. 192, 168 S. E.
423 (1931, 1933).
'lIannerelli v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 171 S. E. 748 (W. Va. 1933); Da
Corte v. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 S. E. 248 (W. Va. 1933).

'Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 70 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A.

4th, 1934, (W. D. Va.), per Soper, Circ. J.
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dition precedent of notification to the insurer regarding insured's
disability. Thus, the "federal" rule in West Virginia, under the
theory of Swift v. Tyson, denies forfeiture in these circumstances,
contrary to the settled doctrine of the state court. It is not improbable, therefore, that litigation of the sort will tend to shift
over to the federal district courts of West Virginia, so long as the
precedents of the Iannerelli and Da Corte cases continue unmodified.
616

Pet. 3, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss4/6

2

